SaaS Pricing Tracker

AI Price IndexThe economics of intelligence

Track how the cost of AI models, inference, compute and useful capability is changing, and what that implies for the cost of AI through 2030.

AI prices are increasingly difficult to describe with a single number. The cost of reproducing yesterday’s AI capability is collapsing, while new frontier models can remain expensive and worldwide spending on inference infrastructure continues to rise. This index tracks both sides of that equation.

Observed prices also reflect strategy. Providers are competing aggressively for developers, users and market share, so today’s API list price is not necessarily an equilibrium price. Three forces set the price customers pay:

  • Technologypushes cost downward
  • Demand and scarcitycan push price upward
  • Competition and strategic subsidycan push customer prices below sustainable economics

The future price is the result of all three. Technology makes intelligence cheaper to produce. Competition can make it even cheaper to buy. But only the first of those effects is guaranteed to survive a normalization of market structure.

By Kim Salmi, SaaS Pricing Tracker. Last updated:

Median frontier price
$10/ 1M input tokens
Median uncached input price across the tracked frontier basket.
Cheapest frontier
$2/ 1M input tokens
Lowest-priced model currently classified as frontier in the maintained index.
Cheapest budget
$0.10/ 1M input tokens
Lowest eligible budget input price in the maintained index.
Fixed-capability decline
~13×cheaper a year
Epoch AI’s measured historical decline in cost at a fixed level of benchmark performance since 2023.

Historical evidence, not a forward forecast

Frontier premium
100×median frontier ÷ cheapest budget
Price gap between the median tracked frontier tier and lowest tracked budget tier.
2030 central scenario
~100×cheaper
AI Price Index central scenario for reproducing approximately 2026-level capability by 2030.

AI Price Index scenario

Our view: The price of individual tokens will fall much more slowly than the cost of obtaining a fixed level of intelligence. By 2030, today’s AI capabilities could cost around 1% of today’s amount even if the most capable models still command premium prices.

Exhibit 1

AI API prices collapsed after 2021, but the frontier is no longer following a simple downward curve

USD per million uncached input tokens; logarithmic scale

Median frontierCheapest frontierCheapest budgetStatistical trendAI Price Index scenario, 2028 and 2030
Today$0.001$0.01$0.10$1$10$100202220232024202520262027202820292030Low $1.25, Jun 2025Median frontier$10 today, 2028: $5–$202030: $3–$30Cheapest frontier$2 today, 2028: $0.50–$42030: $0.20–$5Cheapest budget$0.10 today, 2028: $0.01–$0.202030: $0.003–$0.20

Note: Solid lines are observed list prices, held from one price change to the next. Fine dashed lines are a statistical trend that only continues the compound rate of the last 36 months. Shaded wedges are AI Price Index scenario ranges for 2028, widening to 2030. Forecasts start after the latest observation.

Show the data as a table
MonthMedian frontierCheapest frontierCheapest budget
Nov 2021$60$60$0.80
Feb 2022$60$60$0.80
May 2022$60$60$0.80
Aug 2022$60$60$0.80
Nov 2022$20$20$0.40
Feb 2023$20$20$0.40
May 2023$20$20$0.40
Aug 2023$20$20$0.40
Nov 2023$20$20$0.40
Feb 2024$20$20$0.40
May 2024$10$10$0.50
Jun 2024$12.5$10$0.25
Aug 2024$12.5$10$0.25
Nov 2024$8.75$2.5$0.15
Feb 2025$8.75$2.5$0.15
May 2025$8.75$2.5$0.15
Jun 2025$2.5$1.25$0.15
Aug 2025$2.5$1.25$0.15
Nov 2025$1.25$1.25$0.05
Dec 2025$2$1.25$0.05
Feb 2026$2$1.25$0.05
May 2026$5$2$0.05
Aug 2026$5$2$0.05
Oct 2026$10$2$0.10
Nov 2026$10$2$0.10
May 2027, trend$8.91$1.36$0.079
Nov 2027, trend$7.93$0.93$0.063
Nov 2028, trend$6.29$0.43$0.04
Nov 2030, trend$3.93$0.091$0.016

Source: live and archived API pricing pages of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google (via Vertex AI); SaaS Pricing Tracker analysis. See the full AI model API price history.

The long-run direction remains strongly deflationary: API inference prices are a fraction of their early-2020s levels. But the market has become less uniform. Cheap capability continues to commoditize while suppliers increasingly charge a premium for their newest frontier systems.

This makes a single question, “are AI prices going down?”, less useful. The more important questions are how quickly a fixed level of capability becomes cheaper, how much the newest available capability costs, and how much inference a useful workflow consumes.

Exhibit 2

Cheap intelligence and frontier intelligence are separating into two markets

Frontier premium = median tracked frontier input price ÷ cheapest tracked budget input price

Observed list prices

~100×

current frontier premium

$10 median frontier against $0.10 cheapest budget, per million input tokens.

0×20×40×60×80×100×20222023202420252026100×
Show the data as a table
DateMedian frontierCheapest budgetFrontier premium
Nov 2021$60$0.8075×
Nov 2022$20$0.4050×
May 2024$10$0.5020×
Jun 2024$12.50$0.2550×
Nov 2024$8.75$0.1558.3×
Jun 2025$2.50$0.1516.7×
Nov 2025$1.25$0.0525×
Dec 2025$2$0.0540×
May 2026$5$0.05100×
Nov 2026$10$0.10100×

Source: the index series in Exhibit 1; SaaS Pricing Tracker analysis.

A 100× price gap does not mean the premium model is 100× more capable. It shows how sharply supplier pricing has differentiated between commodity AI capability and access to the current frontier.

The widening premium is consistent with a market in which yesterday’s intelligence is rapidly commoditized while the newest capability remains scarce enough to command premium economics.

Exhibit 3

The same level of AI capability is getting cheaper far faster than token prices suggest

External evidence on price/performance improvement; measures are not directly interchangeable

External research

~13× / year

historical decline in the cost of a fixed measured level of AI performance since 2023

Epoch AI, across five benchmark families. Historical result, not a prediction that the rate continues indefinitely.

Historical empirical, Epoch AI

How many times cheaper a year, log scale

  • Cost of reaching a fixed level of measured performance, five benchmark families

    ~13×

    ~47% cheaper per quarter; ~13× cheaper per year since 2023

  • Fixed capability right after it first appears at the frontier

    ~75×

    ~66% cheaper per quarter; ~75× per year for performance that has just debuted as state of the art

  • Same capability about two years after it first reached the frontier

    ~4.7×

    ~32% cheaper per quarter; ~4.7× per year, half the pace of newly debuted performance

External forecasts, Gartner

  • Provider inference cost for a comparable 1-trillion-parameter LLM

    More than 90% lower in 2030 than in 2025

    Gartner, March 2026

  • Inference cost per agentic workflow

    More than 5× higher through 2028

    Gartner, August 2026

These measures are different. Historical benchmark price/performance, provider inference cost, public API token prices and cost per agentic workflow should not be averaged into a single “consensus annual decline.”
Show the data as a table
SourceDateWhat it measuresResultType
Epoch AISep 2026Cost of reaching a fixed level of measured performance, five benchmark families~47% cheaper per quarter; ~13× cheaper per year since 2023Historical empirical
Epoch AISep 2026Fixed capability right after it first appears at the frontier~66% cheaper per quarter; ~75× per year for performance that has just debuted as state of the artHistorical empirical
Epoch AISep 2026Same capability about two years after it first reached the frontier~32% cheaper per quarter; ~4.7× per year, half the pace of newly debuted performanceHistorical empirical
GartnerMar 2026Provider inference cost for a comparable 1-trillion-parameter LLMMore than 90% lower in 2030 than in 2025External forecast
GartnerAug 2026Inference cost per agentic workflowMore than 5× higher through 2028External forecast

The distinction between list price and capability-adjusted cost is central to AI economics. Epoch AI estimates that, since 2023, the cost of obtaining a fixed level of measured AI performance has fallen about 47% per quarter, or roughly 13× per year.

The decline is not constant. In Epoch’s data, a newly reached frontier performance level becomes cheaper particularly quickly, then the rate moderates as that capability ages. This is one reason our 2030 scenario does not mechanically extrapolate 13× annual improvement.

Gartner’s forecasts illustrate the other half of the problem: the provider cost of running a roughly comparable model can fall by more than 90%, while the cost of a complete agentic workflow still rises because the workflow consumes vastly more inference.

Exhibit 4

We expect 2026-level AI capability to cost roughly 1% as much by 2030

AI Price Index scenarios; cost index, October 2026 = 100

AI Price Index scenario, not external consensus

Slower progressCentralRapid progress
0.1110100202620282030Log scale10Slower progress1Central0.1Rapid progress
YearSlower progressCentralRapid progress
2026100100100
202825 (4× cheaper)4 (25× cheaper)1 (100× cheaper)
203010 (10× cheaper)1 (100× cheaper)0.1 (1,000× cheaper)

Source: AI Price Index scenarios, informed by Epoch AI, The plunging price of thought and the exhibits above.

Our central case assumes dramatically slower improvement than a mechanical continuation of the recent ~13× annual historical rate. That reflects several reasons for caution: benchmark improvements do not transfer perfectly to production, the decline tends to slow as capabilities age, latency and reliability requirements matter, and providers may retain part of the efficiency gain through margins or spend it on more capable systems.

The result is still profound: our central scenario has the cost of reproducing approximately 2026-level AI capability falling about 25× by 2028 and 100× by 2030.

Exhibit 5

One dollar buys far more AI capability than token prices alone reveal

Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index (higher is better) against input price, USD per million tokens, log scale

Observed list prices

Best score for the priceOther modelsAI Price Index scenario 2028: same scores, 25× cheaper
03060$0.01$0.03$0.1$0.3$1$3$10Cheapest budget $0.10Cheapest frontier $2Median frontier $102028 scenario2028: 25× cheaperInput price per million tokensOpus 5.5: 58, $4 per million tokensOpus 5.5Sonnet 5.5: 56, $2 per million tokensSonnet 5.5Fable 5.1, gpt-6-astra: 53, $10 per million tokensFable 5.1, gpt-6-astraHaiku 4.5: 17, $1 per million tokensHaiku 4.5gpt-6.1-sol: 52, $2 per million tokensgpt-6.1-solgpt-5.6-terra: 42, $2 per million tokensgpt-5.6-terragpt-6-luna: 38, $0.1 per million tokensgpt-6-lunaGemini 3.8 Flash: 41, $0.75 per million tokensGemini 3.8 FlashGemini 3.1 Pro Preview: 30, $2 per million tokensGemini 3.1 Pro PreviewGemini 3.5 Flash-Lite: 22, $0.3 per million tokensGemini 3.5 Flash-Litegrok-4.7: 46, $2 per million tokensgrok-4.7deepseek-flash: 39, $0.3 per million tokensdeepseek-flashdeepseek-v4-pro: 36, $1.32 per million tokensdeepseek-v4-proMistral Medium 3.5: 14, $1.5 per million tokensMistral Medium 3.5Mistral Small 4: 11, $0.15 per million tokensMistral Small 4Mistral Large 3: 9, $0.5 per million tokensMistral Large 3Ministral 3 8B: 5, $0.15 per million tokensMinistral 3 8BNova 2 Pro: 14, $1.38 per million tokensNova 2 ProNova 2 Lite: 13, $0.3 per million tokensNova 2 Lite

The blue line is the efficient frontier: the best score available at each price. The dash-dot line moves it by the central AI Price Index scenario for 2028.

Show the data as a table
ModelInput priceScore
Opus 5.5$458
Sonnet 5.5$256
Fable 5.1$1053
gpt-6-astra$1053
gpt-6.1-sol$252
grok-4.7$246
gpt-5.6-terra$242
Gemini 3.8 Flash$0.7541
deepseek-flash$0.3039
gpt-6-luna$0.1038
deepseek-v4-pro$1.3236
Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview$230
Gemini 3.5 Flash-Lite$0.3022
Haiku 4.5$117
Mistral Medium 3.5$1.5014
Nova 2 Pro$1.3814
Nova 2 Lite$0.3013
Mistral Small 4$0.1511
Mistral Large 3$0.509
Ministral 3 8B$0.155

On our own price lines, GPT-4 Turbo-level capability fell from $10 to $0.10 per million input tokens

Cheapest tracked model scoring at least GPT-4 Turbo (127.25) on the Epoch Capabilities Index

  • GPT-4 TurboMay 2024$10
  • Claude 3.5 SonnetJun 2024$3
  • GPT-4oNov 2024$2.50
  • Gemini 2.0 FlashMar 2025$0.15
  • Gemini 2.5 FlashSep 2025$0.30
  • GPT-5 nanoNov 2025$0.05
  • GPT-5.6 LunaSep 2026$0.20
  • GPT-6 LunaOct 2026$0.10

Small rises in between are tier swaps, when a vendor replaces its cheapest model with a better but pricier one. GPT-6 Luna is not scored by Epoch yet; it outscores Claude Haiku 4.5 on the Artificial Analysis index, so it clears the bar.

Source: Artificial Analysis Intelligence Index, read Oct 2026, highest reasoning setting per model; Epoch Capabilities Index, read Oct 2026; list prices from each AI model API pricing page.

Token price is only the retail rate card. A model can be dramatically better value if it achieves nearly the same useful capability with fewer tokens, less reasoning or a much lower unit price.

Over time, the AI Price Index should increasingly measure capability per dollar and cost per successful task alongside raw token pricing. Comparable standardized task-cost data does not yet go back far enough for a historical index, so this exhibit shows today’s cross section; the historical series will expand as comparable data accumulates.

Exhibit 6

Newer GPUs cost more per hour, even as the cost of useful compute falls

Standardized GPU rental benchmarks, USD per GPU-hour, snapshot of 3 October 2026

External research

Neocloud index

  • A100$1.54
  • MI300X$2.63
  • H100$2.77
  • H200$3.40
  • B200$5.86
  • B300$6.70

Hyperscaler index

  • A100$3.76
  • H100$7.20

Bars are standardized market benchmarks, not directly comparable cloud SKUs. See AI infrastructure pricing for individual providers.

Show the data as a table
GPUSegmentUSD / GPU-hour
A100Neocloud$1.54
MI300XNeocloud$2.63
H100Neocloud$2.77
H200Neocloud$3.40
B200Neocloud$5.86
B300Neocloud$6.70
A100Hyperscaler$3.76
H100Hyperscaler$7.20

Source: Silicon Data, Silicon Index; snapshot of the consolidated index page; the index family covers 95% of neocloud GPU providers and all major hyperscalers, published daily.

The latest accelerator does not need to rent for less than its predecessor for AI economics to improve. A B200 or B300 can command a higher hourly price while producing substantially more useful inference during that hour.

The relevant economic variable is therefore increasingly useful compute per dollar, not simply dollars per GPU-hour.

Exhibit 7

Better hardware does not guarantee cheaper GPU-hours

Silicon Data neocloud rental indices, 4 May 2026 to 27 Jul 2026

External research

4 May 202627 Jul 2026$2.57$2.75 H100, +7.0%$2.70$3.09 H200, +14.4%
Show the data as a table
GPU4 May 202627 Jul 2026Change
H100$2.57$2.75+7.0%
H200$2.70$3.09+14.4%

During this twelve-week period in 2026, standardized H100 rental prices rose 7.0% and H200 prices rose 14.4%. This does not establish a permanent direction, but it demonstrates why technological progress cannot be translated mechanically into lower nominal GPU-hour prices.

Strong demand, supply composition and the value of newer memory-rich accelerators can offset depreciation at the rental-price layer.

Exhibit 8

The compute market expects older GPU rental rates to decline, but not collapse

Silicon Data neocloud spot versus 36-month term rates as of 19 July 2026

External research

Spot36-month term rate
A100$1.65$1.40-15%
H100$2.72$2.38-13%
B200$5.62$5.17-8%
Show the data as a table
GPUSpot USD/hour36M term USD/hourDifference
A100$1.65$1.40-15%
H100$2.72$2.38-13%
B200$5.62$5.17-8%

Source: Silicon Data, GPU futures; market snapshot as of 19 July 2026.

Forward pricing was in backwardation across A100, H100 and B200 in July 2026: the market expected lower future rental rates, but only by single- to mid-teen percentages over three years.

This is useful counterweight to simplistic assumptions that hardware progress should drive the nominal GPU-hour price toward zero.

Exhibit 9

Enterprise cloud users pay a large premium for the same class of accelerator

Hyperscaler index ÷ neocloud index, USD per GPU-hour

External research

~2.6×

H100 hyperscaler premium

H100
Neocloud $2.77
Hyperscaler $7.20
2.60×
A100
Neocloud $1.54
Hyperscaler $3.76
2.44×

Source: Silicon Data, Silicon Index; consolidated index, snapshot of 3 October 2026.

Customers do not buy silicon alone. Hyperscaler pricing also reflects availability, networking, managed infrastructure, geography, enterprise agreements, security, compliance and integration.

The same phenomenon appears at the model layer: the raw cost of computation can fall rapidly without every supplier passing the reduction directly into its headline price.

Exhibit 10

Useful compute gets cheaper much faster than the newest GPU-hour

AI Price Index scenario, 2026 = 100, log scale per panel

AI Price Index scenario, not external consensus

Nominal price of a latest-generation GPU-hour

2026100
202890–130
203080–140
101001,000

Useful compute delivered per GPU-hour

2026100
2028400–1,000
20301,500–5,000
1001,00010,000

Effective compute cost per fixed unit of work

2026100
202810–30
20302–10
110100
Show the data as a table
Metric202620282030
Nominal price of a latest-generation GPU-hour10090–13080–140
Useful compute delivered per GPU-hour100400–1,0001,500–5,000
Effective compute cost per fixed unit of work10010–302–10

Source: AI Price Index scenario, informed by Exhibits 6 to 8.

Our central view is not that the newest accelerator becomes dramatically cheaper in nominal dollars. It is that each accelerator-hour produces dramatically more useful work.

By 2030, we model effective compute cost for a fixed unit of work at roughly 2–10% of today’s level even if the nominal price of the newest GPU-hour remains around today’s order of magnitude.

Exhibit 11

AI infrastructure investment is moving from hundreds of billions to trillions

Distinct estimates with different scopes; not additive

External research

Annual planned capex

~$800B

2026

Five major hyperscalers' planned capex, McKinsey

~$1.0T

2027

Five major hyperscalers' planned capex, McKinsey

Cumulative through 2030

  • Goldman Sachs Research

    Capex of the four largest hyperscalers (Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft), 2025–2030

    ~$5.3T
  • McKinsey

    Global data-center physical infrastructure, excluding IT hardware

    >$1.7T
  • McKinsey

    Total global data-center capital requirement

    ~$7T

Each bar has its own scope. Do not add them together.

Show the data as a table
SourceScopePeriodValue
McKinseyFive major hyperscalers' planned capex2026~$800B
McKinseyFive major hyperscalers' planned capex2027~$1.0T
Goldman Sachs ResearchCapex of the four largest hyperscalers (Alphabet, Amazon, Meta, Microsoft), 2025–2030Through 2030, cumulative~$5.3T
McKinseyGlobal data-center physical infrastructure, excluding IT hardwareThrough 2030, cumulative>$1.7T
McKinseyTotal global data-center capital requirementThrough 2030, cumulative~$7T

The scale of the buildout is a central part of the price story. Five major hyperscalers have announced about $800 billion of capex for 2026 and $1 trillion for 2027, according to McKinsey, with the vast majority directed toward AI infrastructure.

Goldman Sachs Research estimates the four largest hyperscalers will spend roughly $5.3 trillion on AI and data centers through 2030. McKinsey separately estimates around $7 trillion of total global data-center capital requirements through 2030, including $1.7–1.9 trillion of construction costs.

These estimates overlap and use different scopes. They should be read as evidence of the scale of the investment cycle, not summed into a single total.

Exhibit 12

Data-center electricity demand roughly doubles by 2030 while AI-focused consumption triples

IEA central projection, global data-center electricity consumption, TWh

External research

02004006008001,00020252030950

~3×

AI-focused data-center electricity, 2025 to 2030

Shown as a multiple: the IEA summary gives the growth factor, not a comparable absolute TWh value.

~3%

of global electricity demand from data centers in 2030

Show the data as a table
YearAll data centers, TWhAI-focused, index
2025485100
2030950~300

The IEA’s updated central projection has global data-center electricity consumption rising from 485 TWh in 2025 to 950 TWh in 2030, around 3% of global electricity demand. Electricity use by AI-focused data centers grows considerably faster, roughly tripling over the same period.

Power is not a permanent token-price floor: model and hardware efficiency can improve faster than electricity costs. But grid connections, generation, transformers, cooling and construction constrain how quickly additional compute capacity can be deployed.

Exhibit 13

AI inference demand may already be growing faster than supply

Current external estimates are highly uncertain

External research

Current global inference demand at current prices, tokens per second, log scale

0.2B4B0.1B1B10B

Current growth proxy: ~10× / year

Source: Epoch AI, Is a compute crunch coming?; Epoch calls these estimates highly uncertain.

Epoch AI estimates current inference demand at roughly 200 million to 4 billion tokens per second and cites proxy data suggesting growth around 10× per year. The range is intentionally wide because global token consumption, model mix and private inference are poorly observed.

We therefore use this as evidence of extraordinary current demand growth, not as a rate to extrapolate mechanically through 2030.

Exhibit 14

Our central case assumes inference demand grows faster than available capacity

AI Price Index scenario; 2026 = 100; log scale

AI Price Index scenario, not external consensus

Inference demand, centralAvailable capacity, central
1001,00010,000100,00020262027202820292030Log scale15,000Inference demand, central4,000Available capacity, central

2030 scenario ranges, multiple of 2026 level

Demand50×–500×, central 150×
Capacity20×–80×, central 40×
1×10×100×1,000×
Show the data as a table
YearDemand indexCapacity index
2026100100
2027500300
20282,000800
20296,0001,800
203015,0004,000

Source: AI Price Index scenario, informed by Epoch AI, Is a compute crunch coming? and Exhibits 11 and 12.

Current usage growth is too extreme and too uncertain to extrapolate directly. Our scenario therefore assumes substantial deceleration in both demand and capacity growth.

Even after that deceleration, the central case has inference use rising about 150× from 2026 to 2030 versus about 40× growth in available capacity. This is the mechanism behind our view that frontier compute can remain scarce while older capability becomes extremely cheap.

Exhibit 15

Cheaper chips do not translate one-for-one into cheaper AI tasks

The layers between an accelerator-hour and a finished task

  1. Hardware and accelerator economics

  2. Datacenter, electricity and networking

  3. Inference software and utilization

    batching · quantization · kernels · speculative decoding · parallelism

  4. Model efficiency

  5. Tokens and compute required by the workload

    context · reasoning · output · retries · multimodal inputs

  6. Caching, routing and tools

  7. Provider margin, scarcity, service tier and strategic pricing

  8. Cost per successful task

Cost per successful task = (input + cache reads + cache writes + reasoning/output + tools + retries + failed attempts) / accepted completed tasks

A token is an accounting unit, not the final economic output. Two models with identical token prices can have very different task economics if one requires fewer tokens, less reasoning, fewer retries or can reuse cached context.

For production AI, cost per successful task increasingly matters more than cost per input token.

Exhibit 16

AI gets cheaper, so we use vastly more of it

Measured external evidence and clearly labelled illustration

External forecast, Gartner, August 2026

AI inference costs per agentic workflow forecast to increase more than 5× through 2028.

Gartner also states that routing a task to an agentic reasoning model can cost a provider at least five times as much as a basic chatbot interaction, often more as complexity rises.

Illustrative economics, not a measured forecast

WorkloadRelative unit costInference consumedWorkflow cost
Simple 2026 AI task1001100
Same capability in 2030111
Frontier 2030 agent10–2050–200+potentially >100

Relative values, simple 2026 task = 100 for unit and workflow cost. The multiplication is illustrative, not a precise forecast.

Intelligence becomes cheaper. We spend the savings buying more intelligence.

Falling unit costs unlock applications that would previously have been uneconomic. Reasoning systems spend more tokens thinking; agents repeatedly call models and tools; longer contexts keep more information active; and multimodal systems process richer inputs.

The result is a classic demand response: the price of a unit can collapse while expenditure per advanced workflow, and total expenditure across the economy, rises.

Exhibit 17

Competition can make today’s AI price lower than its sustainable economic cost

Observed API prices reflect strategy as well as technology

Conceptual bridge, not to scale; no values are estimated

  1. Underlying inference cost
  2. +Long-run required margin
  3. =Sustainable economic price
  4. −Strategic subsidy / competitive pricing
  5. =Observed customer price

Observed AI price = underlying cost + sustainable margin − strategic subsidy

Underlying cost

accelerator depreciation or rental · electricity · networking · data-center cost · utilization · inference software · model-specific compute requirements

Sustainable margin

R&D · training new models · operations · sales · capital costs · return on invested capital

Strategic subsidy

venture or equity capital · strategic investor capital · cloud credits · hyperscaler economics · customer-acquisition spending · ecosystem lock-in · developer adoption · cross-subsidy from another product · introductory, free-tier and promotional pricing

AI providers are not necessarily optimizing current-period inference profitability. Frontier laboratories and hyperscalers are simultaneously competing for developers, enterprise adoption, consumer market share and control of the future AI platform layer.

That creates an important forecasting risk: a very low API price today may reflect genuine technological deflation, strategic subsidy, or both. We therefore do not assume that every observed decline in market price represents an equivalent decline in sustainable cost.

Provider unit economics are mostly private. We treat subsidy as a market-structure risk and a forecasting variable, not as a known fact about any particular API, and we do not claim that any provider sells API tokens below cost.

Exhibit 18

The same technology can produce three different price paths, depending on market structure

AI Price Index market-structure scenarios; qualitative, no probabilities assigned

AI Price Index scenario, not external consensus

Scenario A

Subsidy persists

Competition remains extremely aggressive. Capital remains abundant. Providers keep prioritizing adoption and ecosystem control.

  • Commodity API prices fall extremely quickly
  • Prices may stay close to marginal cost
  • Free and cheap tiers remain common
  • API price declines can exceed underlying compute-cost declines

Scenario B, central case

Rational competition

Inference costs decline rapidly and competition remains strong, but providers nevertheless demand positive unit economics.

  • Commodity prices decline substantially
  • Frontier pricing remains premium
  • Margins normalize gradually
  • Observed price declines roughly track, but do not fully capture, technology improvements

Scenario C

Subsidy unwinds

Capital discipline increases or market concentration rises. Providers seek substantially higher margins.

  • Some API prices can rise even while inference costs fall
  • Free tiers shrink
  • Discounts become less aggressive
  • High-usage plans move toward metered pricing
  • The gap between technological cost decline and customer price decline becomes very visible

Scenario B, rational competition, is the AI Price Index central case and underlies the central values in Exhibit 20. Scenarios A and C sit behind the lower and upper ends of its ranges.

The scenarios differ in the subsidy term, not in technology. Inference costs fall rapidly in all three. What changes is how much of that decline customers see, and when.

Exhibit 19

External research points to cheaper unit inference and a vastly larger AI infrastructure base

Evidence map; confidence labels are qualitative editorial judgments, not probabilities

External research

TopicExternal evidenceHorizonConfidence
Fixed measured capability costEpoch: ~13× cheaper a year since 2023Epoch AI, The plunging price of thoughtHistoricalHigh for studied benchmarks
Comparable large-model provider inference costGartner: >90% lowerGartner, March 20262030 vs 2025Medium
Agentic workflow inference costGartner: >5× higherGartner, August 2026Through 2028Medium
Major hyperscaler capexMcKinsey: ~$800B in 2026, ~$1T in 2027McKinsey, The $2.3 trillion horizon2026–27Medium-high
Four largest hyperscalers, AI and data-center capexGoldman Sachs: ~$5.3T, 2025–2030Goldman Sachs ResearchThrough 2030Medium
Overall data-center electricityIEA: 485 → 950 TWhIEA, Energy and AI, executive summary2025–30Medium-high
AI-focused data-center electricityIEA: ~3×IEA, Energy and AI, executive summary2025–30Medium-high
Current inference demandEpoch: ~0.2–4B tokens a secondEpoch AI, Is a compute crunch coming?CurrentLow-medium
Current demand-growth proxyEpoch: ~10× a yearEpoch AI, Is a compute crunch coming?CurrentLow
Below-cost AI accessOpenAI CEO: losing money on the $200-a-month ChatGPT Pro consumer planFortune, Sam Altman says OpenAI is losing money on ChatGPT Pro, January 2025Jan 2025High for that plan; says nothing about API margins

The external evidence is unusually consistent on direction but not on exact magnitude. Equivalent-model inference becomes much cheaper, capital deployment and electricity demand rise sharply, and AI workloads become substantially more inference-intensive.

There is no rigorous “consensus token price for 2030” because these sources forecast different layers of the stack. The next section is therefore explicitly our synthesis rather than an average of incompatible forecasts.

Exhibit 20

Commodity AI keeps getting cheaper; frontier pricing remains in roughly today’s order of magnitude

AI Price Index market-price scenarios; USD per million uncached input tokens, log scale

AI Price Index scenario, not external consensus

A major uncertainty is how long AI providers are willing to subsidize inference. Current market prices are set during an unusually intense period of platform competition and capital investment. If suppliers eventually optimize for sustainable margins rather than market share, customer prices could fall materially more slowly than underlying inference costs, or temporarily rise even as the technology becomes cheaper.

Future market price = future cost-to-serve + future sustainable margin − future strategic subsidy

Median frontier

Oct 2026$10
2028$5–$20, central $10
2030$3–$30, central $10
$0.001$0.01$0.10$1$10$100

Cheapest frontier

Oct 2026$2
2028$0.50–$4, central $1.50
2030$0.20–$5, central $1
$0.001$0.01$0.10$1$10$100

Commodity / budget

Oct 2026$0.10
2028$0.01–$0.20, central $0.05
2030$0.003–$0.20, central $0.02
$0.001$0.01$0.10$1$10$100

Cost of 2026-level capability, index, October 2026 = 100

Oct 2026100
20281–25, central 4
20300.1–10, central 1
0.1110100
Show the data as a table
MetricOct 2026 baseline2028 central2028 range2030 central2030 range
Median frontier$10$10$5–$20$10$3–$30
Cheapest frontier$2$1.50$0.50–$4$1$0.20–$5
Commodity / budget$0.10$0.05$0.01–$0.20$0.02$0.003–$0.20
Cost of 2026 capability, index10041–2510.1–10

The upper end of each range incorporates

  • scarcity
  • provider margin normalization
  • reduced subsidies
  • continued premium frontier positioning

The lower end incorporates

  • extremely strong competition
  • continuing strategic subsidy
  • rapid efficiency gains
  • open-model pressure

The future value of the subsidy term is unknown. Pricing normalization risk is one reason the ranges stay broad.

Source: AI Price Index scenarios; baseline from Exhibit 1.

We do not expect the price of frontier intelligence to follow the same curve as the price of reproducing today’s capability.

Our central 2030 case keeps the median frontier API in roughly today’s order of magnitude, around $10 per million uncached input tokens, while commodity inference falls toward roughly $0.01–0.03. Meanwhile, obtaining approximately 2026-level capability falls to around 1% of today’s cost.

The frontier price is not a hard floor. It is our market-structure view: suppliers can spend efficiency gains on larger models, longer reasoning, higher reliability, multimodality and more compute rather than passing every improvement through as a lower token rate.

We also do not forecast by applying a compute-cost decline to today’s list price. A 90% fall in the cost of compute does not imply a 90% lower API price when part of today’s price may be a strategic subsidy that later normalizes. The central values correspond to Scenario B, rational competition, in Exhibit 18.

Exhibit 21

AI becomes cheaper per unit of intelligence, and vastly larger as an industry

2030 synthesis

What gets cheaper

2026-level AI capability
~100× cheaper
AI Price Index central scenario by 2030.
Comparable-model provider inference
>90% cheaper
Gartner forecast, 2030 vs 2025.
Commodity API input
~$0.01–0.03 / 1M tokens
AI Price Index central market-price view.
Effective compute for fixed work
~10–50× better
AI Price Index scenario order of magnitude.

What gets bigger or stays expensive

AI inference usage
~150×
AI Price Index central 2026 to 2030 scenario.
Inference capacity
~40×
AI Price Index central scenario.
Overall data-center electricity
485 → 950 TWh
IEA, 2025 to 2030.
AI-focused electricity
~3×
IEA, 2025 to 2030.
Four largest hyperscalers, AI and data-center capex
~$5.3T
Goldman Sachs Research, 2025 to 2030.
Median frontier API price
~$10 / 1M input
AI Price Index central 2030 view.

The apparent contradiction is the point. Technological deflation makes each unit of useful intelligence much cheaper, which expands the set of economical applications. The additional demand then drives more infrastructure, more tokens, more reasoning and more aggregate spending.

Technological cost
Strongly downward
Sustainable economic price
Downward, but probably much more slowly
Observed market price
Can temporarily sit above or below sustainable economics

The lowest market price is therefore not necessarily the best predictor of the long-run cost of AI. During a platform land-grab, price can be a strategic weapon.

AI Price Index view

Our view: cheap intelligence, expensive frontier

  1. 1

    Commodity intelligence trends toward negligible cost

    Capabilities that require expensive frontier systems today should migrate into smaller, cheaper and more specialized models. The economic value of yesterday’s frontier is therefore likely to commoditize quickly.

  2. 2

    The frontier does not become free

    The frontier itself keeps moving. Providers can spend efficiency gains on larger models, longer reasoning, multimodal processing, latency and reliability rather than simply lowering the list price.

  3. 3

    Demand is likely to grow faster than prices fall

    Lower prices unlock new workloads. Agents, background automation, generated media, coding systems and machine-to-machine inference can consume orders of magnitude more computation than today’s chat interactions.

  4. 4

    Compute per dollar improves much faster than GPU-hour prices fall

    The latest accelerator can remain expensive per hour while becoming dramatically cheaper per useful unit of computation.

  5. 5

    Token price becomes a progressively weaker economic metric

    Capability per dollar and cost per successful task should increasingly be tracked alongside headline input and output token rates.

  6. 6

    AI becomes simultaneously cheap and expensive

    2026-level intelligence becomes commodity-priced. The 2030 frontier remains premium-priced. Aggregate spending on AI becomes enormous.

  7. 7

    Today’s price may not be the equilibrium price

    AI is still in a platform land-grab. Providers have strong incentives to acquire developers, users and enterprise workloads before the market structure stabilizes. Some products can therefore be priced at margins that would not make sense in a mature market. We expect technological inference costs to continue falling rapidly, but customer prices may not fall at the same rate if today’s competitive subsidies eventually normalize.

By 2030, today’s intelligence may cost around one-hundredth as much while the world spends vastly more producing and consuming intelligence overall.

Quantum computing could eventually change the cost curve, but it is not in our central forecast

0%

quantum contribution included in the AI Price Index central inference-cost forecast through 2030

Direct

Quantum algorithms eventually accelerate economically relevant parts of AI computation.

Indirect

Quantum simulation contributes to semiconductor and material discovery, chemistry, energy technologies, cooling and batteries.

AI → quantum

AI improves calibration, control, error correction, algorithm discovery and system optimization.

The AI Price Index will incorporate quantum into its quantitative AI cost model only after a quantum or hybrid system demonstrates lower end-to-end economic cost for a commercially relevant workload than the contemporary classical alternative.

Questions people ask

Are AI API prices going down?

Yes, but the answer depends on what is being measured. The cheapest useful models have become dramatically less expensive, while premium frontier pricing has recently diverged upward. More importantly, research suggests the cost of obtaining a fixed level of AI capability is falling much faster than headline token prices.

How much will AI cost in 2030?

Our central scenario is that by 2030 the cost of obtaining approximately 2026-level AI capability falls by around 99%, while frontier API prices remain in roughly the same order of magnitude as today. Commodity inference could fall toward roughly $0.01–0.03 per million input tokens, but increasingly complex reasoning and agentic workloads mean total AI spending is likely to rise rather than fall.

Why can AI spending rise if AI gets cheaper?

Lower unit costs make far more AI usage economical. Agents, reasoning systems, coding tools and background automation consume many more inference steps than a simple chatbot interaction. Falling costs therefore expand demand and can increase total spending, a version of the Jevons paradox.

Will GPU prices fall?

Effective compute costs should continue falling rapidly, but the rental price of the newest GPU does not have to. New accelerators can command premium hourly rates while delivering much more inference per hour, making useful compute cheaper even when the hardware-hour remains expensive.

Are current AI API prices sustainable?

We do not know for every provider. Model-serving costs, utilization and negotiated compute prices are mostly private. In a rapidly growing platform market, suppliers may intentionally accept unusually low margins to gain adoption, and some AI access products have demonstrably been priced below realized usage cost. For that reason, the AI Price Index treats market price and underlying economic cost as separate concepts.

Could AI prices rise even if compute gets cheaper?

Yes. Prices can rise if strategic subsidies disappear, providers seek higher margins, competition declines, demand outruns capacity, or a new frontier model consumes much more compute. Falling technological cost creates downward pressure on price, but it does not mechanically determine the customer price.

AI capability is likely to get much cheaper, but AI as an industry is not going to get smaller. Falling unit costs will drive more consumption, larger models, longer reasoning and more autonomous workloads. By 2030, today’s intelligence may cost around one-hundredth as much, while the industry spends vastly more delivering intelligence overall.

AI prices are being driven by two extraordinary forces at the same time: technological deflation and a platform land-grab. Technology makes intelligence cheaper to produce. Competition can make it even cheaper to buy. But only the first of those effects is guaranteed to survive a normalization of market structure.

Methodology

Frontier

Each model maker contributes one frontier line: the input price of its top general-purpose model on its own API pricing page (OpenAI: Flagship model; Anthropic: Top model; Google: Gemini Pro tier; Mistral: Mistral Large 3; xAI: grok-4.6; DeepSeek: deepseek-v4-pro). The line follows whichever model holds that position at each date. The median and cheapest frontier series are the median and minimum across makers in the index.

Budget

Each maker also contributes one budget line, the small, fast tier it lists on its own pricing page (OpenAI: Cheapest model; Anthropic: Haiku tier; Google: Gemini Flash tier; Mistral: Mistral Small 4; xAI: grok-4.3; DeepSeek: deepseek-flash). The budget series is the minimum across makers.

Provider entry

A maker joins after a year of history. Resellers are left out, so a model is never counted twice; Google is read through Vertex AI, which matches the Gemini API list price. The historical basket is not rewritten when new makers join.

Prices and dates

Prices are standard, uncached list prices per million input tokens. Each observation is dated by the live or archived pricing page that shows it, so a price change happened on or before that date. Capture dates are not yet separated from effective dates; where they differ, the index lags the real change.

Market price versus economic cost

The AI Price Index primarily observes customer-facing market prices. These should not be interpreted as direct measurements of providers’ underlying inference costs or sustainable long-run prices. Providers can temporarily price above cost because frontier capacity is scarce, or below sustainable economics because market share and ecosystem adoption are strategically valuable.

Where reliable evidence exists, we separately identify promotional pricing, unusual discounting and documented below-cost access. We do not estimate hidden provider margins without sufficient evidence.

Three kinds of price decline

  1. Technology-driven deflation. Actual serving cost falls because of better hardware, better models, inference optimization, higher utilization, caching or quantization. This is the most structurally durable type of decline.
  2. Competitive margin compression. Providers can serve profitably but accept lower margins because competition is intense. This can persist for a long time, but it is not the same as a fall in technological cost.
  3. Strategic subsidy or loss-leading pricing. Price sits below the level that would support sustainable standalone economics. This is the least safe kind of decline to extrapolate indefinitely.

The historical market-price series in Exhibit 1 contains all three effects. The index does not separate them observation by observation.

Four price curves

1. Frontier access price
What customers pay for the newest capability. Observed, Exhibit 1.
2. Commodity market price
What customers pay for inexpensive inference. Observed, Exhibit 1.
3. Fixed-capability cost
What it takes to reproduce a constant level of capability. External evidence, Exhibit 3.
4. Sustainable economic price
The price that covers serving cost, capital requirements and a sustainable provider margin, without assuming indefinite strategic subsidy. Only partially observable; not estimated.

The fourth curve is not fabricated. It explains why today’s very low prices may not be a reliable long-run floor.

Price sustainability

Prices are classified qualitatively, never as a “true cost per token”. A company’s operating losses include training, R&D, employees, capex and customer acquisition, so they do not prove negative gross margin on a particular API request, and are never treated as API-level subsidy evidence.

Unit economics unknown
The default. Serving costs, utilization and negotiated compute prices are private, so no judgment is made.
Apparently sustainable
Direct evidence suggests the price covers serving cost with a positive margin.
Uncertain
Indirect evidence exists but points in no clear direction.
Potentially subsidized
A credible source indicates the price, or the product it belongs to, sits below realized cost.
Explicitly promotional
The supplier itself labels the price as introductory, temporary or discounted.

Status taxonomy

Observed
A price verified directly for that date. Every point in Exhibit 1 is observed.
Reconstructed
A historical price whose effective period is reconstructed from a dated primary announcement or archive.
Announced
A supplier has announced the future change, but it is not yet effective.
Statistical trend
A mechanical extrapolation of recent historical prices.
External forecast
A forecast published by an outside source.
AI Price Index scenario
Our explicit analytical assumption or forecast.

Sources and evidence

Raw data and further reading

What each model maker in the basket charges today, USD per million tokens (input / output).

MakerFrontierBudgetIn indexUnit economics
OpenAI$10 / $50Flagship model$0.10 / $0.50Cheapest modelsince 2021Unit economics unknown
Anthropic$10 / $50Top model$1 / $5Haiku tiersince 2024Unit economics unknown
Google$2 / $12Gemini Pro tier$0.75 / $3.75Gemini Flash tiersince 2025Unit economics unknown
Mistral$0.50 / $1.50Mistral Large 3$0.15 / $0.60Mistral Small 4from 2027Unit economics unknown
xAI$2 / $6grok-4.6$1.25 / $2.50grok-4.3from 2027Unit economics unknown
DeepSeek$1.32 / $3.96deepseek-v4-pro$0.30 / $1.20deepseek-flashfrom 2027Unit economics unknown